Autobiographical Record · Formal Declaration · Ian Paul Short · England
Personal Promise Pledge 2026
A permanent record, set down in the first person, as part of the autobiography of Ian Paul Short
I, Ian Paul Short, set this down as a permanent record, published online for as long as I am able to maintain it, and preserved as part of my autobiography.
This document exists because of what was done to me. It is addressed, in its purpose if not in its form, to every person who acted against me with lies, with deceit, with deliberate injury to my health, and with contempt for my rights as a human being, as a tenant, and as a neurodivergent senior citizen. They will know who they are. The record will remain.
I make no apology for the permanence of this record. Those who acted with honesty and good faith have nothing to fear from it. Those who did not must understand that the passage of time does not extinguish what was done, and that the law of England makes specific provision for precisely that circumstance.
What is recorded here is not bitterness. It is evidence. It is a draft legal argument, constructed without representation, demonstrating that I understand what was done to me, under which laws it was done, and what remedies remain available. It also demonstrates that I have the capacity, the will, and the knowledge to pursue those remedies.
I further record that the conduct described in the later part of this document was not the first time in my life that I encountered the behaviour of rogue landlords. The first time I heard about a rogue landlord I was a schoolboy. Little did I know that I would be unlawfully evicted some 50 years later with a business associated with the said individual. I did not choose to grow up with that experience. But I did grow up understanding, earlier than most, that the power a landlord holds over a family in a rented home can be exercised lawfully or unlawfully — and that when it is exercised unlawfully, the consequences for the people on the receiving end are devastating and lasting.
That early experience did not make me bitter either. It made me informed. It is why, decades later, I volunteered my expertise to an advice centre serving the most vulnerable renters in one of the most deprived communities in Bournemouth. It is why I listened when Reverend Martin Broad explained to me how section 21 was being weaponised against tenants who dared to complain. And it is why, when rogue landlord behaviour was eventually directed against me personally — as a settled, lawful, neurodivergent senior citizen who had done nothing wrong — I recognised it immediately for what it was, retained the evidence from the moment it began, and pledged to pursue every lawful remedy available to me.
This is that pledge. This is that record. It begins with my life before the events complained of, and it will not end until those events have been answered for.
Note on the legal argument contained in this document. The sections that follow constitute a draft legal argument written by Ian Paul Short without legal representation, published as a demonstration of the capacity to construct a reasoned argument — identifying causes of action, applying statute, marshalling evidence and addressing limitation. No individual or organisation is named. All statutes cited were in force in England during the relevant periods. This document is a work in progress and will be refined as the chronology is completed and further evidence assembled.
Background — Before the Events Complained Of
Community contribution — Boscombe Independent Advice Centre
Before the Claimant became the subject of the conduct complained of in this argument, he gave his time and expertise as a volunteer to a registered charity serving one of Bournemouth’s most deprived communities. This background is not incidental. It establishes the Claimant as a person of active civic commitment, community-minded, technically capable and widely experienced — not a passive or vulnerable figure who could be dismissed as unable to understand or assert his rights.
The Claimant served as a volunteer implementing and maintaining all prerequisite information technology requirements of the Boscombe Independent Advice Centre, based at the Bourne Spring Centre, St Marys Road, Bournemouth, Dorset, BH1 4QP — operating in association with St Mary’s Church, Boscombe. The organisation was a generalist advice centre providing free, impartial and independent advice on any issue to residents and workers in the Boscombe and Springbourne areas of Bournemouth — some of the most economically deprived wards in the south of England. No trustees received remuneration. The Claimant likewise volunteered without payment.
The IT infrastructure of an advice centre of this kind is not a trivial undertaking. It encompasses secure case management systems, client confidentiality protocols, data protection compliance, network reliability, hardware maintenance and the continuity of access to online legal resources and referral databases upon which frontline advisers depend to serve vulnerable clients. The Claimant was responsible for implementing and sustaining these systems. He did so in a voluntary capacity, drawing on professional experience acquired over a career that included extended periods working and living abroad.
The Chief Executive Officer of the Boscombe Independent Advice Centre at the relevant time was Reverend Martin Broad. His registered legal name is Paul Martin Broad, as recorded at Companies House in connection with charitable organisations in the Bournemouth and Poole area, where he is listed as an active director of Community Action Network, Beech House, 28–30 Wimborne Road, Poole, BH15 2BU. He was known to colleagues and friends as Martin Broad, and is referred to by that name throughout this document. The directors of record at Companies House during the period of BIAC’s operation included Margaret Rachel Cooper, Margaret Mary Dugan, Catherine Judith Marie Parker and Des Persse.
What I learnt from Martin Broad — GDPR, Section 21 and retaliatory eviction
During the period of my voluntary work at BIAC, Reverend Martin Broad provided me with a substantial grounding in the practical operation of two areas of law that would later become directly relevant to my own circumstances: the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and section 21 of the Housing Act 1988.
In relation to GDPR, Martin explained the obligations of an organisation handling personal data about clients — many of whom were among the most vulnerable residents in Boscombe — and the standards required to protect that data. As the volunteer responsible for BIAC’s IT infrastructure, I implemented and maintained the systems that gave effect to those obligations. This experience gave me a working knowledge of data protection principles that is directly relevant to any organisation that may have held or shared personal data concerning the Claimant without lawful basis.
In relation to Section 21, Martin brought to my attention the specific problem of retaliatory eviction: the practice by which private landlords were using the no-fault provisions of section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 as a weapon against tenants who made legitimate complaints about disrepair, harassment or other breaches of their obligations. Martin explained clearly that this was the predictable and common response by rogue landlords when tenants exercised their legal rights. A tenant who complained could expect, not remedy, but eviction. The Deregulation Act 2015 had introduced a partial constraint on this — section 33 rendering a section 21 notice invalid where served within six months of a legitimate complaint — but in practice this protection was limited and widely circumvented.
I proposed at that time the formation of an action group to campaign for the outright revocation of section 21. The proposal did not come to fruition as a formal organisation. However, I became aware in the period that followed that tenants were challenging retaliatory evictions in court and that constituents across the country were writing to their Members of Parliament demanding legislative change. The Claimant was one of those tenants who experienced exactly what Martin Broad had described. He was evicted after making a legitimate complaint. The law that had been used against him was the very law whose abuse he had sought to resist.
Parliamentary confirmation — the law has now changed
The Claimant records that Tom Hayes, Labour Member of Parliament for Bournemouth East — the constituency within which the Claimant resides — has been a prominent parliamentary advocate for renters’ rights and has specifically championed the abolition of section 21 no-fault evictions. In a written piece in the Bournemouth Daily Echo in March 2025, Tom Hayes described meeting rogue landlords who force renters to face cramped and unsafe homes, and stated that he was proud to vote for the Government’s Renters’ Rights Bill to end no-fault evictions. He observed that one in three households in Bournemouth East is in the private rented sector, and stated: “We have to get this right because renting is the reality for so many families, professionals and retirees” and “With strong legislation and strong local action, we can make sure every rented home is safe for the people who live in it.”
The Renters’ Rights Act 2025 received Royal Assent on 27 October 2025. Section 21 no-fault evictions are abolished with effect from 1 May 2026, the date on which all assured shorthold tenancies in the private rented sector automatically convert to periodic assured tenancies. From that date, a landlord may only recover possession by establishing one of the specified grounds under section 8 of the Housing Act 1988 as amended. The Act applies to both new and existing tenancies simultaneously, giving all tenants security immediately. The Government has stated explicitly that the Act is designed to “end the injustice of tenants being trapped paying rent for substandard properties” and to “empower them to challenge bad practice without fear of retaliatory eviction.”
Tom Hayes MP wrote to all residents in his constituency confirming that the law had been changed. The letter, received by the Claimant, is reproduced in full below:
Tom Hayes MP
595 Christchurch Road
Boscombe
Bournemouth
BH1 4AN
Dear Resident,
I promised to help fix the insecure private rented sector, I pledged to end no-fault evictions, and today our new laws are delivering on these promises.
Awaab’s Law came into force on Monday 27 October. Two-year old Awaab died after being exposed to mould. His parents Faisal and Aisha begged for help, their home was deemed ‘unfit for human habitation’ after Awaab’s death, yet their cries for support were ignored.
Now all social landlords must act when serious health hazards like damp and mould are reported. No longer will families like Awaab’s have to live in a home where mould, damp, and serious health hazards pile up. This is real change.
The Renters’ Rights Bill delivers further real changes:
- Ends no-fault evictions: Renters no longer face the constant anxiety of being made homeless just for challenging unfair rent increases and dodgy practices.
- Grants tenants the right to own a pet: Pets go to rehoming centres because their owners cannot find pet-friendly housing. This will be a game-changer.
- Cracks down on when and how landlords can raise rents.
- Replaces fixed-term tenancies with periodic tenancies.
- Abolishes blanket bans on tenants with children or receiving benefits.
- Bans landlords and agents from stoking bidding wars.
This is a historic time for renters, delivering the stability many need. As your MP, I’ve:
- Spoken up in Parliament on behalf of renters.
- Supported renters facing the threat of poverty, homelessness, and instability.
- Held renters’ rights roundtables and met with Shelter.
- Met with landlords and BCP Council to press for change.
After the King signs this bill into law, renters will begin to feel the benefit. Our work is not done — I will continue fighting for housing that works for everyone.
I’m really keen to hear from you about your own experiences of renting and the broader housing crisis, so that I can continue representing your lived experiences.
Please share this letter with others who may be interested, and do get in touch with me at tom.hayes.mp@parliament.uk, tomhayes.org.uk/surgeries, or 01202 029181 to share your thoughts and experiences or request a surgery on this issue or any other issue, local or national.
You can also sign up for my newsletter at tomhayes.org.uk/newsletter for regular updates on my work.
Warm regards,
Tom Hayes MP
Labour Member of Parliament for Bournemouth East
Tom Hayes MP is actively collecting renters’ experiences to inform his ongoing work in Parliament. If you have experienced the kind of conduct described in this document — retaliatory eviction, rogue landlord behaviour, or the failure of housing providers to act — you can share your experience directly with your MP:
Share your renting experience →Survey hosted by Tom Hayes MP’s constituency office, 595 Christchurch Road, Boscombe, BH1 4AN. Independent of this document.
The significance of this legislative change to the Claimant’s argument is this: Parliament has now confirmed, in statute, that the use of section 21 to evict tenants who make legitimate complaints was an injustice. The Renters’ Rights Act 2025 is Parliament’s definitive answer to the abuse that Reverend Martin Broad first described to the Claimant during his time at BIAC, and which the Claimant subsequently experienced directly. That the Claimant was right to complain, and that his eviction in response to that complaint was wrong, is no longer a matter of argument. It is a matter of law.
References — the law change
- Act
- Renters’ Rights Act 2025
- Royal Assent
- 27 October 2025
- Section 21 abolition date
- 1 May 2026 (private rented sector)
- Tom Hayes MP
- Labour MP for Bournemouth East · elected 4 July 2024
- Constituency office
- 595 Christchurch Road, Boscombe, BH1 4AN
- MP website
- tomhayes.org.uk
- Official guidance
- GOV.UK — Guide to the Renters’ Rights Act
Official record — Boscombe Independent Advice Centre
- Chief Executive Officer
- Reverend Martin Broad (registered: Paul Martin Broad)
- Charity Commission number
- 1151034
- Companies House number
- 07852966
- Registered address
- Bourne Spring Centre, St Marys Road, Bournemouth, Dorset, BH1 4QP
- Incorporated
- 18 November 2011
- Commenced trading
- 1 April 2013
- Current status — Companies House
- Dissolved — 18 April 2017
- Current status — Charity Commission
- Removed charity — no longer registered
- Last filed accounts
- Year ending 31 March 2015 · Total income: £104,749
- Objects
- To relieve need and hardship amongst people in Boscombe and Springbourne by providing a range of advice and information services
Sources: Charity Commission register · Companies House register
The Claimant’s contribution to this community institution — in the years immediately before the events that led to his eviction — is set down here as context. A person who volunteers his technical expertise to an advice centre serving the most vulnerable residents of Boscombe, without payment, is not a person without standing, without capability, or without the capacity to recognise unlawful conduct when he encounters it. He recognised unlawful content in the 2017 letter the moment he read it. He retained it. He was right to do so.
I — The Claimant
The Claimant is Ian Paul Short, a neurodivergent senior citizen who resided lawfully at the accommodation in question from 2014 until his eviction in 2022–23. The Claimant’s neurodivergence constitutes a disability within the meaning of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010, having a substantial and long-term adverse effect upon day-to-day activities including, but not limited to, sensory processing and olfactory perception. The Claimant has volunteered his professional expertise in community service without remuneration, as evidenced by his work at the Boscombe Independent Advice Centre. He has no legal representation and brings this argument in person. The capacity to construct this argument is itself a matter of record.
II — Nature of the Claim
The Claimant advances a claim arising from a course of conduct spanning 2017 to 2023, originating in a letter distributed to all residents of the accommodation in late 2017 and culminating in the Claimant’s eviction following the making of legitimate complaints. The causes of action advanced, individually and cumulatively, include:
- Harassment — course of conduct under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997
- Negligence — failure of duty of care, applying the neighbour principle in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562
- Disability discrimination — discrimination arising from disability (Equality Act 2010 s.15), failure to make reasonable adjustments (s.20), and harassment related to disability (s.26)
- Retaliatory eviction — Deregulation Act 2015 s.33
- Defamation — Defamation Act 2013
- Malicious communication — Malicious Communications Act 1988 and Communications Act 2003 s.127
- Breach of the right to respect for the home — Human Rights Act 1998 / ECHR Article 8
- Safeguarding failure — Care Act 2014 s.42
III — Material Facts
Fact 1 — Commencement of lawful tenancy
The Claimant took up lawful residence at the accommodation. All rights attaching to a residential tenant under the Housing Act 1988 applied from this date. The Claimant resided quietly, lawfully and without incident for three years prior to the first act complained of. This establishes the Claimant’s status as a settled and lawful resident and defeats any suggestion that his presence at the accommodation was in any way irregular.
Housing Act 1988 Protection from Eviction Act 1977Fact 2 — The letter: distributed to all residents, unlawful in content, authorship in question
In late 2017 a letter was distributed to all residents of the accommodation. The Claimant read it and retained it immediately upon receipt. He did so because he formed the view, in the moment of reading, that the content was likely to cause general unrest among residents and that the content was poorly constructed and most likely unlawful on its face. The letter has been retained continuously since that date and constitutes primary evidence.
The Claimant further records the following material observation: he has professional experience of living and working abroad and of editing correspondence produced by colleagues for whom English was a second language. The 2017 letter bore linguistic characteristics — in its phrasing, construction and idiom — that the Claimant recognises from that experience as indicative of a document written or dictated by a person for whom English was not their first language. This is an observation going to authorship, not to the character or origin of any person. It raises the following material question: was the apparent author the true originator of the letter, or was another person responsible for its creation? If the latter, every person in the chain of creation and distribution bears joint and several responsibility for the consequences that followed. Each must be put to strict proof.
Malicious Communications Act 1988 Communications Act 2003 s.127 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 Limitation Act 1980 s.32 — concealmentFact 3 — Immediate unrest: dispute between neighbours below
The letter gave immediate rise to contentious disputes between two neighbours residing in flats below the Claimant’s accommodation. One of those neighbours was using his dog to cause disturbances to other residents. The Claimant was not at this stage a party to or target of these disputes. He was, however, disturbed by the conduct occurring below him. This establishes that the letter produced, immediately and directly, precisely the unrest the Claimant had foreseen. The causal link between the letter and the commencement of the course of conduct complained of is established from the outset.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 Housing Act 1996 s.153AFact 4 — The Claimant drawn in: a witness his disability prevented him from being
One of the neighbours involved in the disputes below attended the Claimant’s flat and requested that the Claimant corroborate a complaint that cannabis smoke was emanating from a flat on the ground floor. The Claimant was unable to corroborate this complaint. The Claimant has a significantly impaired sense of smell, which is a characteristic associated with his neurodivergent profile and constitutes an aspect of his disability within the meaning of Equality Act 2010 s.6. This impairment directly and foreseeably prevented the Claimant from providing the corroboration sought. No fault attaches to the Claimant for this incapacity.
The Claimant records, however, that visitors to his flat had independently and without prompting made observations about a pungent smell emanating from the ground floor flat. These are third-party accounts, obtained without any involvement of the Claimant, which corroborate the substance of the complaint in a manner the Claimant was physiologically unable to provide himself.
This incident is the first occasion upon which the Claimant’s disability became a material factor in the sequence of events culminating in his eviction. He was asked to perform a function that his disability prevented him from performing. No reasonable adjustment was offered. No alternative means of corroboration was suggested. The housing provider, had they been informed, would have owed a duty to consider and make reasonable adjustments at this earliest stage.
Equality Act 2010 s.6 — disability Equality Act 2010 s.15 — discrimination arising from disability Equality Act 2010 s.20 — reasonable adjustments Civil Evidence Act 1995 — third-party accountsFact 5 — A course of conduct: from bystander to target
Over this period the unrest seeded by the 2017 letter escalated into conduct directed specifically at the Claimant as a neurodivergent resident. Having been drawn in from the outset as a peripheral figure — and having been unable through no fault of his own to provide corroboration — the Claimant became the target of a sustained course of conduct. That course of conduct, extending across two or more occasions, satisfies the statutory threshold under section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The housing provider was aware, or ought to have been aware, of the course of conduct throughout this period. They owed the Claimant a continuing and uninterrupted duty to manage the antisocial behaviour, to protect a vulnerable neurodivergent resident from harassment, and to make reasonable adjustments for his disability. None of those duties were discharged.
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s.1 & s.3 Equality Act 2010 s.26 — harassment Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 Care Act 2014 s.42 — safeguarding duty Housing Act 1996 s.153AFact 6 — Eviction, false statements and malicious communication
Following the Claimant’s legitimate complaints about an antisocial tenant, the Claimant was evicted. Every resident has the right to make such complaints. The Deregulation Act 2015 s.33 renders a section 21 notice invalid where it is served within six months of a legitimate complaint by the tenant. If that is the position on the facts, the notice was void in law from its inception.
Further, false statements were made about the Claimant to the effect that his conduct would constitute grounds for police action. These statements were false. They were made with the intention of damaging the Claimant’s reputation and of silencing him. The Defamation Act 2013 requires the maker of such a statement to prove its truth; the burden is reversed. The Malicious Communications Act 1988 criminalises the sending of a communication that is false and known to be false, intended to cause distress. The communication complained of satisfies both tests.
This was the final and most serious act in a course of conduct whose origins lay directly in the letter of late 2017. The chain of causation from that letter to this eviction is continuous and unbroken.
Deregulation Act 2015 s.33 — retaliatory eviction Defamation Act 2013 — burden of proof reversed Malicious Communications Act 1988 Human Rights Act 1998 · ECHR Article 8 Equality Act 2010 s.136 — reversed burden2023
Fact 7 — Possession proceedings: court appearance and unsubstantiated arrears allegation
On 18 July 2023 the Claimant appeared before the presiding judge in possession proceedings brought by the landlord under section 21 of the Housing Act 1988. The Claimant appeared as a litigant in person. A responsible adult was present throughout the proceedings on his behalf.
The Claimant gave an account to the court, from memory, of the retaliatory nature of the eviction, characterising the landlord’s action as a direct response to legitimate complaints made in the exercise of his statutory rights as a tenant.
During the proceedings the representative of the landlord presented to the court a claim of rent arrears against the Claimant. The Claimant denied the allegation by a gesture directed at the judge. The matter was not examined or pursued further. No evidence in support of the arrears allegation was adduced or tested. The allegation was not established. A section 21 no-fault possession claim requires no arrears; its introduction in this context constitutes a further instance of the conduct complained of and is addressed in Submission 7.
Housing Act 1988 s.21 — no-fault possession Deregulation Act 2015 s.33 — retaliatory eviction Defamation Act 2013 s.1 — serious harm Civil Procedure Rules — duty of candourIV — Legal Analysis and Submissions
Submission 1 — Negligence: duty, breach and foreseeable harm
The author or authors of the 2017 letter owed a duty of care to all residents of the accommodation to whom it was addressed. Applying the neighbour principle established in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, a person who sends a communication to identifiable recipients must take reasonable care not to cause them harm. A letter addressed to all residents of a shared building identifies those residents as the precise class of persons to whom the duty is owed. The content of the letter was, as the Claimant recognised upon reading it, likely to cause unrest. The harm that followed — a sustained course of conduct over five years targeting a neurodivergent senior citizen — was the foreseeable consequence of that letter. Duty, breach and consequential harm are established.
- Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 — neighbour principle
- Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 — three-stage test: foreseeability, proximity, fair just and reasonable
Submission 2 — Harassment: a course of conduct from 2017 to 2023
The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s.1 prohibits a course of conduct which a person knows or ought to know amounts to harassment. A course of conduct requires conduct on at least two occasions. The conduct complained of extends from late 2017 to 2022–23 — a period of over five years, comprising multiple distinct acts, each forming part of a single continuous course directed at the Claimant. Under s.3 of the Act, a civil claim for damages lies, with a limitation period of six years from the last act. The last act in the course of conduct was the eviction and the false statements made in 2022–23. The claim is within time.
- Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s.1, s.3
- Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34 — employer liability for harassment
Submission 3 — Disability discrimination: three grounds
(a) Discrimination arising from disability — s.15. The Claimant’s eviction, following his legitimate complaint, arose in consequence of his making that complaint. The making of a complaint is something he did that was connected to his disability, in that the conduct he complained of was directed at him in part because of his neurodivergence. Under s.15, the Respondent must show the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. It was not.
(b) Failure to make reasonable adjustments — s.20. At the earliest stage, in late 2017, the Claimant was placed at a substantial disadvantage by a provision, criterion or practice — namely, the expectation that he could corroborate complaints by smell, a sense materially impaired by his disability. No adjustment was made. Throughout the 2017–23 period the housing provider failed to adapt their management of antisocial behaviour to accommodate a neurodivergent resident who was particularly vulnerable to its effects.
(c) Harassment related to disability — s.26. Conduct that has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment, where related to disability, constitutes harassment. The course of conduct over 2017–23 satisfies this test. Under s.136, the burden of proof shifts to the Respondent once the Claimant establishes facts from which discrimination could be inferred.
- Equality Act 2010 s.6, s.15, s.20, s.26, s.136
- Aylott v Stockton-on-Tees Borough Council [2010] EWCA Civ 910
Submission 4 — Retaliatory eviction
The Claimant made legitimate complaints about an antisocial tenant. The Deregulation Act 2015 s.33 provides that a section 21 notice is invalid where served upon a tenant who has made a complaint about the condition of the property or about matters affecting their occupation, within six months prior to service. If — as the evidence suggests — the section 21 notice was served within six months of the Claimant’s complaint, the notice was void in law and the eviction founded upon it was unlawful from the outset. No reliance can be placed upon an invalid notice.
- Deregulation Act 2015 s.33
- Housing Act 1988 s.21 — requirements for validity
- Protection from Eviction Act 1977
Submission 5 — Defamation and malicious communication
False statements were made to the effect that the Claimant’s conduct would constitute grounds for police action. Under the Defamation Act 2013, a statement is defamatory if it causes or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant. Such a statement — attributing criminal behaviour to a person — is defamatory on its face. The burden under the 2013 Act falls upon the maker of the statement to prove its truth; it is not for the Claimant to disprove it. The statement was false. It was made in circumstances where the maker knew, or ought to have known, that it was false. The Malicious Communications Act 1988 provides that it is a criminal offence to send a communication that conveys a false statement, known to be false, with the intent to cause distress. Both provisions are engaged.
- Defamation Act 2013 s.1, s.2 — serious harm, truth defence
- Malicious Communications Act 1988 s.1
- Communications Act 2003 s.127
Submission 6 — Joint and several liability: the question of true authorship
Where two or more persons act in concert to produce a tortious or unlawful result, each is jointly and severally liable for the full consequences. If the 2017 letter was written or dictated by a person other than its apparent author — as the linguistic analysis available to the Claimant suggests may be the case — then both the true author and the apparent author are joint tortfeasors. Each bears full liability for the entire course of events flowing from that letter. The apparent author cannot escape liability by asserting that another person wrote the words. The true author cannot escape liability by asserting that another person signed and distributed them. Each must be put to proof of their role.
- Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48 — joint liability
- Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978
Submission 7 — Conduct before the court: the unsubstantiated arrears allegation
In possession proceedings brought by the landlord under section 21 of the Housing Act 1988, the Defendant appeared before the presiding judge as a litigant in person. The Defendant gave an account, from memory and without notes, of the retaliatory nature of the eviction, characterising the landlord’s action as a direct response to legitimate complaints made by the Defendant in the exercise of his statutory rights. A responsible adult was present throughout the proceedings on behalf of the Defendant.
During those proceedings, the representative of the landlord presented to the court a claim of rent arrears against the Defendant. The Defendant denied the allegation by a gesture directed at the judge. The matter was not raised or examined further by the court. The arrears claim was accordingly not established, not admitted, and not pursued.
The presentation of an unsubstantiated allegation of rent arrears in open court, against a Defendant who denied it and against whom no evidence in support was adduced or tested, is consistent with the pattern of conduct already documented in this argument. The introduction of a collateral financial allegation into possession proceedings — proceedings that had been initiated by the landlord on the no-fault ground under section 21, a ground that requires no misconduct by the tenant — constitutes a further instance of the conduct complained of. A no-fault possession claim requires no arrears. The raising of arrears in that context served no legitimate procedural purpose. The Defendant puts every responsible party to proof of the basis upon which that allegation was made and the instructions upon which the landlord’s representative was acting when it was presented.
- Housing Act 1988 s.21 — no-fault possession ground
- Defamation Act 2013 s.1 — serious harm
- Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s.1 — course of conduct
- Civil Procedure Rules — duty of candour
V — Limitation
Harassment — civil claim
Six years from the last act in the course of conduct. The eviction and false statements of 2022–23 constitute the last act. The claim is within time.
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s.3
Negligence
Six years from the date the cause of action accrued, or three years from the date the Claimant knew or ought to have known of the damage — whichever is the later.
Limitation Act 1980 s.2, s.14
Disability discrimination — Employment Tribunal / County Court
Six months from the last act. Continuing acts are treated as a single act ending on the last occasion — here, 2022–23. Time runs from that date.
Equality Act 2010 s.118, s.131
Defamation
One year from publication. Where the making of the false statement was deliberately concealed from the Claimant or its true nature was obscured, s.32 of the Limitation Act 1980 may operate to extend time.
Defamation Act 2013 · Limitation Act 1980 s.32
Deliberate concealment — the 2017 letter
Where a defendant deliberately conceals a fact relevant to the claimant’s cause of action, time does not begin to run until the claimant discovered, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, the concealed fact. The true authorship and purpose of the 2017 letter was not apparent to the Claimant at the time of receipt. Time may not have run at all on causes of action flowing directly from that concealment.
Limitation Act 1980 s.32
Malicious communication
As a criminal matter, there is no limitation period for prosecution. As a civil matter, limitation runs from the date of the communication complained of, subject to the concealment provisions where applicable.
Malicious Communications Act 1988
VI — Statement of Intent
In late 2017 a letter arrived at the place I called home. It was addressed to all residents. I read it and kept it immediately — because I recognised in the moment of reading that its content was likely to cause unrest and that the content was poorly written and most likely unlawful. I have never discarded it. That letter is evidence, and it has been evidence since the day I received it.
I further record that I have lived and worked abroad and have edited correspondence produced by colleagues for whom English was a second language. The 2017 letter bore the linguistic characteristics I recognise from that experience. This is not an observation about any person’s character or origin. It is an observation about authorship. If the person who signed or distributed that letter was not its true originator — if another person wrote or dictated it — then every person in that chain is a joint tortfeasor, bearing full and several liability for everything that followed. Each must be put to strict proof of their role.
The letter gave immediate rise to disputes between two neighbours below me. One was using his dog to cause disturbances. I was not at that stage a target. I was disturbed. Then one of those neighbours came to my door and asked whether I could smell cannabis smoke from the ground floor flat. I could not. I have a significantly impaired sense of smell, which is a characteristic of my neurodivergent condition. I was asked to be a witness I was physiologically unable to be, through no fault of my own. I record that visitors to my flat had independently mentioned a pungent smell from the ground floor — third-party accounts, obtained without my involvement, that corroborated the complaint I could not personally confirm. That moment was the first at which my disability became a material factor in what would ultimately become my eviction.
Over the years that followed I became the target. Having been drawn in as a bystander from the beginning, the conduct turned upon me. The housing provider owed me a continuous duty throughout: to manage the antisocial behaviour, to protect a neurodivergent resident from harassment, to make reasonable adjustments. None of those duties were discharged.
When I made legitimate complaints about an antisocial tenant — as I was fully entitled to do — I was evicted. The Deregulation Act 2015 had made that unlawful. And then false statements were made about me: that my conduct would constitute grounds for police action. Those statements were false. The burden of proving their truth falls upon whoever made them. They will be required to discharge that burden.
The Limitation Act 1980 s.32 provides that where relevant facts have been deliberately concealed from a claimant, time does not run until those facts could reasonably have been discovered. The true authorship of the 2017 letter was not apparent to me. Time may not have run at all on the causes of action rooted in that concealment.
I set this argument down in 2026 as a permanent record. I do so to demonstrate that I am capable of constructing a reasoned legal argument, identifying causes of action, applying statute and authority, and marshalling evidence — without representation. I will pursue every lawful avenue. I will require every responsible party to be put to proof. And I will see this through to conclusion.
Drafted and declared by
Ian Paul Short — Litigant in Person
Bournemouth, England · 2026
Witnessed by
Witness name and signature
Date of witnessing